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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to test, even in a weak legal system, there is any legal
mechanism to increase shareholders monitoring over the management and get better
results for them. We used the T test to verify if the mean of each analyzed variable
has presented significant difference between firms with and without Fiscal Council. We
found that the existence of an active Fiscal Council is associated with higher ROE
which it improves firm pertormance. We also found that firms with Fiscal Council
engage significantly less in earnings management. The Fiscal Council is an important
mechanism of shareholders protection and monitoring allowed by the Law. It a
separate corporate body independent of the board of directors and management.
Keywords: Fiscal Council, Brazil, Corporate Governance, Emergent Market
JEL Classification: J28
Resumen
El propósito de este trabajo es evaluar, si en un sistema legal débil, existe algún
mecanismo legal para aumentar la vigilancia accionistas sobre la gestión y obtener
mejores resultados para ellos. Se utilizó la prueba T para verificar si la media de cada
variable analizada presentó diferencias significativas entre empresas con y sin
Consejo Fiscal. Encontramos que la existencia de un Consejo Fiscal activo se asocia
con un mayor ROE. También se encontró que las empresas con el Consejo Fiscal se
involucran mucho menos en earnings management. El Consejo Fiscal es un
importante mecanismo de protección de los accionistas y el control permitido por la
ley. Es una persona jurídica separada independiente del consejo de administración y
de gestión.
Palabras claves: Consejo Fiscal, Brasil, Gobernanza Corporativa, Mercado
Emergente
Clasificación JEL: J28
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1. INTRODUCTION.
The relation among corporate governance, development of financial market, firm
performance and value has been subject of intense research. According La Porta et al.
(1998) the country legal system is fundamental to firm corporate governance.
La Porta et al. (1998) examined investor protection laws and the quality of
enforcement in 49 countries. The authors identified four major legal regimes
(Common, French, German and Scandinavian) and they found that, in general, legal
protections for shareholders and creditors are stronger in English common law
countries than in countries with French-style laws, such as Brazil, as extreme
positions and German and Scandinavian systems located among them. Brazil is
considered by La Porta et al. (1998) as a country with little legal protection for
investors and all its consequences.
One of the recurring problems of corporate governance in Brazil is submitted to
structure of ownership, in which the control can be separated from the property.
Several studies suggest that the control of Brazilian companies is concentrated in the
hands of few shareholders owning less than 50% of the total number of shares of the
company and managing totally it (Standard & Poor's, 2004; Valadares and Leal, 2000;
Monaco, 2000).
La Porta et al. (2002) considered that in this situation, the shareholders majority have
the power to expropriate the minority. Saito (2001) has found that companies in Brazil
with lower degree of separation of cash-flow and voting rights, and higher liquidity are
less likely to have their minority shareholders expropriated.
According Silveira and Saito (2008), besides ownership structure and board of director
composition, the access and content of public information is one of the main corporate
governance problems in Brazil. Schiehll (2004) considers that in Brazil the most crucial
issue would be how to offer protection to minority shareholders.
Earnings management is a strategy that can be used by managers of some firms to
smooth earnings. The Fiscal Council has competence to improve shareholder
protection and force companies to better disclosure for investors, reducing the
earnings management. Viegas (2005) considers the fiscal council is a Brazilian
specific legal provision to support the rights of minority shareholders.
Decourt, Martinewski and Pietro Neto (2007) analyzed the financial reports form
Brazilian Listed Companies from 1995 to 2004 and they found strong evidence of
earnings management. The results suggest that managers use earnings management
to avoid report small losses.
Brazilian investors may take advantage of an important mechanism to improve
shareholders protection allowed by the local Law. The Fiscal Council, as a way to
increase monitoring, is one example of improvement that could be asked and easily
installed by shareholders and it is not very common used to most listed Brazilian
companies.
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The Fiscal Council may be constituted by request of any shareholders holding, alone
or in a group of shareholders together, at least 5% of the outstanding shares of the
company. Holders of preferred, non-voting shares, are entitled to elect one member of
the Fiscal Council. Non-controliing holders of voting shares representing at least 10%
of all voting shares may also elect one member of the Fiscal Council.
The Fiscal Council set up in Brazilian companies should be composed of professionals
nominated by the minority - non-controlling common and preferred stockholders - and
majority shareholders and it has as main function to monitor the activities and financial
statements of the company. Fiscal Council is not attached to the board of directors as
the audit committee for the USA companies. It is nominated by the shareholders at any
ordinary or extraordinary general assembly and its responsibilities are to the
shareholders only.
The Fiscal Council can mitigate some important problems of corporate governance as
the separation of cash-flow and voting rights and earning management. Levy Neto
(2005) believes that the Fiscal Council, if properly used, according to the law, can be
very positive for all shareholders.
The benefits of Fiscal Council to shareholders, it is not only the monitoring function.
We believe that the Fiscal Council can reduce earning management and improve the
firm performance. Based on these assumptions, the purpose of this research is to
investigate the impact of the existence of Fiscal Council in the firm performance and
quality of firm reports.
This research has focused on alternative governance mechanisms that might be better
aligned with shareholders" interests and It contributes to show that there are good
mechanisms to improve corporate governance even in countries with weak legal
investor protection. The shareholders should exercise their power to have better firm
corporate governance and consequently to improve the firm financial performance.
This article is structured as follows: section 1 is the introduction, section 2 is a review
of Fiscal Council legal background by Brazilian Law, section 3 is our sample, section 4
is the method, section 5 is the results, section 6 is the concluding remarks and section
7 is references.
2. FISCAL COUNCIL.
According to Article 163 of Law Number 6.404/76 the Brazilian companies may
constitute a Fiscal Council, which may be either permanent or appointed for a specific
fiscal year, by request of shareholders holding at least 5% of the outstanding shares of
the company.
The Fiscal Council of a Brazilian corporation is mainly charged with monitoring the
financial management and reporting of a firm. It does not hire external auditing and it
does not interfere on the financial reports.
The Fiscal Council is not equivalent to an audit committee as contemplated by the
Securities Exchange Act and requirements of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).
The Fiscal Council is totally independent of the firm, the board of directors, the
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management team and from external auditors. This is a very important characteristic,
because it can act with more freedom than an audit committee, which it is attached,
nominated by, some members are part of it and in some cases it may have other
internal persons of the company, to the board of directors like in the USA. Bolton
(2010) found that audit committee independence has no relation to firm performance
or firm value. Klein (2002) has different view and found that audit committee
independence is positively related to proxies for high quality financial reports.
According to the Brazilian law, the Fiscal Council has the following legal authorities:
• to supervise the acts of the officers and ensure that they comply with their legal
and statutory duties;
• to give an opinion on the annual report of the management, including the
supplementary information deemed necessary or useful for deliberation at a
general meeting;
• to give an opinion on any proposals of the administrative bodies to be
submitted to a general meeting, regarding an alteration in the capital, the issue
of debentures or subscription bonuses, investment plans or capital budgets,
dividend distribution, transformation, merger, consolidation or division;
• to report any error, fraud or criminal acts it may discover to the administrative
bodies, and, if these fail to take the necessary steps to protect the corporation's
interests, to a general meeting suggesting an appropriate course of action;
• to call the annual general meeting should the administrative bodies delay doing
so for more than one month, and an extraordinary general meeting whenever
serious or urgent matters occur, including in the agenda of the meeting such
matters as it may deem necessary;
• to examine, at least every three months, the trial balance sheet and other
financial statements periodically prepared by the corporation;
• to examine the accounts and financial statements for the fiscal year and to
provide an opinion on them;
• to exercise such responsibilities during a liquidation, taking into account the
special provisions which regulate liquidations.
The Fiscal Council is composed of a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 5 members,
who are elected by a shareholder vote and, accordingly, the controlling shareholder
typically elects a majority of its members. Holders of preferred, non-voting shares are
entitled to elect one member of the Fiscal Council. Non-controlling holders of voting
shares representing at least 10% of all voting shares may also elect one member of
the Fiscal Council. The members of the Fiscal Council of a company may not be
employees, directors, officers or affiliated with directors or officers of the company.
3. SAMPLE.
The sample was collected in the Bovespa site (www.bovespa.com.br) and
Economatica database in August 2010. We have accessed the Publicly-held
Companies Reports that listed companies sent to CVM regarding fiscal years of 2004,
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 to collect the information if the firm had Fiscal
Council in that specific year.
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The financial data came from Economatica database. We have included in our sample,
only firms with positive net worth. The sample has information of 1,950 reports of 417
firms. It is divided in 281 reports from 2004, 294 reports from 2005, 323 reports from
2006, 351 reports from 2007, 352 reports from 2008 and 349 reports from 2009. The
descriptive statistics of the companies in our sample are presented in Table 1.
Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Usted
Firms
358
343
394
403
392
385
Firms in
Sam^e
281
294
323
351
352
349
Market >alue(biMions R$)
Bowspa Sample
904.9
1,128.5
1,544.9
2,477.6
1,375.6
2,334.7
660.3
896.5
1,321.8
2,166.7
1,312.2
2,255.7
Firms mth Fiscal
Council
110
133
139
151
162
187
39.15%
45.24%
43.03%
43.02%
46.02%
53.58%
ROE
14.61%
12.85%
13.64%
15.62%
10.71%
15.51%
Tobin Q
2.01
2.57
3.01
2.82
1.53
2.28
Dividend
Payout
47.26%
51.37%
49.44%
48.39%
47.36%
50.96%
Debt/
Bjiity
108.8%
113.2%
96.2%
86.0%
112.2%
98.1%
Debt cost
29.2%
29.4%
29.0%
25.8%
34.2%
22.2%
Beta
0.88
0.77
0.90
0.96
0.97
0.97
Table 1 : Descriptive statistics of the Sample
Our sample include 85.71% of firms listed in Bovespa and the market value of the
firms in our sample represent 88.19% of market value of firms listed in Bovespa.
The absolute number of firms with Fiscal Council has increased all years from 2004 to
2009. The majority of newly listed companies have been on the Novo Mercado, the
segment of BOVESPA that requires greater transparency, disclosure, stronger
corporate governance practices and only voting shares are allowed.
The Brazilian Law allows that holders of preferred, non-voting shares are entitled to
elect one member of the Fiscal Council. Most of the new listed firms in 2006 and 2007
do not have non-voting shares, thus, it became harder to minority shareholders to elect
a Fiscal Council member, what was a disincentive to minority shareholders request the
firm to constitute a Fiscal Council.
The CVM changed the understanding of the Law in 2008. Now, minorities of any firm
that has at least 10% of voting shares in the market can elect a member one member
of the Fiscal Council. This new understanding probably stimulated the increase of the
number of firms with Fiscal Council.
4. METHOD.
It was analyzed if there was an active Fiscal Council in the company in each year. This
data was collected in the Publicly-held Companies Reports sent to CVM.
We used the Tobin's q and ROE as a measure of value and profitability performance
and Beta as a risk metric to analyze if the existence of Fiscal Council increase the
company performance and reduce the firm risk.
We also test the effect of existence of an active Fiscal Council in the dividend payout,
firm leverage, and firm debt cost. We use the debt to equity ratio (liabilities divided by
total equity) to measure the company leverage.
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We used the T test to verify if there is a significant difference between firms with and
without Fiscal Council.
The existence of significant difference between both groups alone does not prove that
the active Fiscal Council affects the observed variable. Maybe, the existence of the
Fiscal Council could be a consequence of another factor too.
To increase our confidence that the existence of the Fiscal Council is relevant we
tested the effect of the existence of Fiscal Council in other groups: firms without ADR,
firms listed in one of the Special Levels of Corporate Governance of Bovespa, firms
not listed in one of the Special Levels of Corporate Governance of Bovespa and we
compare the evolution of the firm after and before the adoption of the Fiscal Council.
To test if the existence of Fiscal Council will reduce the earnings management we
analyze the pattern of frequency distributions around the zero mean of standardized
earnings. This model proposed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) assumes that
differences in probability density between two neighbors close intervals in the
histogram follows a normal distribution approximately.
The histograms were divided into strips of 5% in 5% and were considered for the
purpose of this research, as small losses, losses of up to 5% of equity, while the small
profits were considered as gains up to 5% of equity.
Thus, if there was no management of the results, the number of small profits of the
entire sample should be close to the amount of small losses. For the annual samples,
the number of years with small profits higher frequency of the frequency of small
losses should be close to the number of years in which the ratio was reversed.
As a test of statistical significance was used statistic T described by Degeorge, Patel
and Zeckhauser (1999) which tests the discontinuity of an empirical distribution. This
model assumes that differences in probability density between two neighbors close
intervals in the histogram follows a normal distribution approximately.
We have applied the test in one group with firms without Fiscal Council and in another
group with firms that have Fiscal Council.
5. RESULTS.
5.1 Firm Performance and Value
It was evaluated if firms with Fiscal Council pertorm better firms without Fiscal Council.
The ROE, as expected, is much higher in firms with Fiscal Council and this difference
is statistical significant. The results are shown in table 2.
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Firms vtith Fiscal Council
Firms without Fiscal Council
ROE
N
1073
909
IVfean
11.08%
-1.20%**
P-\alue
0.0470
Tobin Q
N
770
394
Mean
2.20
2.46**
P-\alue
0.0402
*** ** * ,' , * denotes a significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
Table 2: Firm performance and value
The Tobin O is correlated with ROE, thus we expected to find that firms with Fiscal
Council have higher Tobin O too. However, in contrast to ROE, with Fiscal Council
have lower Tobin Q. This difference is also statistical significant. This result suggests
that the investors do not value the Fiscal Council.
Most firms with ADR have Fiscal Council too, because the Board of Auditors is
mandatory for firms with ADR. The SEC allows that the Fiscal Council of Brazilian
firms act as Board of Auditors. Consequently 91% of firms with ADR in our sample
have Fiscal Council.
We made the same test only with firms without ADR to verify if the higher ROE is
consequence of the ADR instead of Fiscal Council. The results are almost the same.
This reinforces the hypothesis that Fiscal Council contribute to increase firm ROE and
the investors do not value Fiscal Council. The results are presented in Table 3.
Firms vAth Fiscal Council
Firms mthout Fiscal Council
ROE
N
894
896
Mean
11.59%
-1.51%*
P-value
0.0513
T o U n Q
N
620
385
Mean
2.14
2.45**
P-\alue
0.0201
Table 3: Firm performance and value - Group with forms without ADR
The fact of the firm have adhered to some Corporate Governance Level could induce
to a false interpretation of the importance of the Fiscal Council in the analyzed
variable, thus we also tested the value and performance differences between
companies with and without Fiscal Council among firms that have adhered to some
Corporate Governance Level and firms that have not adhered to some Corporate
Governance Level. The results are presented in Table 4 and Table 5.
Firms with Fiscal Council
Firms without Fiscal Council
ROE
N
460
298
IVfean
12.29%
-6.22%**
P->alue
0.0107
TohinQ
N
362
184
Mean
2.33
2.95***
P-value
0.0018
*, * denotes a significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
Table 4: Firm performance and value - Group with firms listed in some Corporate
Governance Level
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Firms TOth Fiscal Council
Rrms without Fiscal Council
ROE
N
613
611
Mean
10.17%
1.25%**
P-value
0.0124
ToHnQ
N
408
210
Mean
2.09
2.04
P->alue
0.3937
***, **, * denotes a significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
Table 5: Firm performance and value - Group with firms not listed in some
Corporate Governance Level
The firms with Fiscal Council have greater ROE in both groups. The highest difference
is between firms listed in some Corporate Governance Level. In this group there is the
highest difference in Tobin Q too. This suggest investor value some mandatory
Corporate Governance practices of these levels, however they are not so important as
another non-mandatory as the Fiscal Council that has greater impact in firm ROE.
Although all evidences that Fiscal Council increase firm ROE, we compared the ROE
in the year after Fiscal Council adoption with the year before Fiscal Council adoption.
The results are presented in Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9.
Firms vAth Fiscal Council adopted in 2005
Firms with Fiscal Council adopted hefore 2005
Firms with Fiscal Council adopted after 2006
Firms without Fiscal Council
N
21
80
25
92
ROE variation from
2004 to 2006
-11.69%
-11.35%
-30.31%**
-16.83%*
P-value
0.48844
0.03643
0.08606
*** ** * ,*, * denotes a significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
Table 6: ROE variation from 2004 to 2006
We can see that 2006 was a bad year to Brazilian firms, but firms with Fiscal Council
were less affected, independently if the Fiscal Council was recent or not. Firms that
would adopt Fiscal Council in the future had the worst performance.
Firms with Rscal Council adopted in 2006
Firms with Fiscal Council adopted before 2006
Rrms with Fiscal Council adopted after 2007
Firms without Fiscal Council
N
7
110
21
94
ROE variation from
2005 to 2007
2.56%
0.08%
-2.60%
-18.85%
P-value
0.4588
0.49949
0.18596
Table 7: ROE variation from 2005 to 2007
The firms with Fiscal Council have recovered their losses from 2006 and returned to
2005 level. The firms without Fiscal had a very poor result in the same period, however
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the firms that would adopt Fiscal Council in the future weren't so bad this year as
2006.
Firms vtith Fiscal Council adopted in 2007
Firms with Fiscal Council adopted before 2007
Firms with Fiscal Council adopted after 2008
Firms without Fiscal Council
N
8
105
15
90
ROE variation from
2006 to 2008
22.88%
-0.65%
-1L1O%*
-3.76%
P-value
0.1248
0.08185
0.14156
*, * denotes a significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
Table 8: ROE variation from 2006 to 2008
The firms that have adopted Fiscal Council in 2007 had an excellent result in 2008. In
the same year firms without Fiscal Council had loses and the firms with Fiscal Council
for more than one year were stable.
It is important to pay attention in the group of firms that hadn't adopted Fiscal Council
in that year, but had adopted it until 2009. This group has a very poor ROE before the
adoption the Fiscal Council, but after its adoption, they present a very good ROE.
firms with Fiscal Council adoptedin 2008
Firms with Fiscal Council adoptedhefore 2008
Firms without Fiscal Council
N
13
118
119
ROE variation from
2007 to 2009
-2.34%
-17.01%
-31.91%*
P-\alue
0.20448
0.08375
*, **, * denotes a significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
Table 9: ROE variation from 2007 to 2009
Year 2009 was a terrible year for companies, however, for those that had adopted the
Fiscal Council in 2008 the loses were very small. These firms were part of the worst
group before the adoption of Fiscal Council. Every year the group of firms that had
adopted Fiscal Council had improved his ROE.
The group of firms with Fiscal Council for much time had bad results, but those firms
were much better than firms without Fiscal Council.
These all results together suggest that, the Fiscal Council is not only an instrument of
protection to minority shareholders. The Fiscal Council has an important contribution to
increase the firm profitability.
5.2 Dividend Payout and Leverage
The dividend payout is similar to both groups. It seems that the Fiscal Council has not
any effect in the dividend policy of Brazilian companies. It is responsibility of the Fiscal
Council examine if the firm pays dividends according company's social statute or if it is
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silent about this topic, if the company pays the minimum dividend required by Brazilian
Law.
Although dividends payment shall be examined by the Fiscal Council it is not its
responsibility define the dividend policy. Decourt and Procianoy (2009) conducted a
survey with CFO about dividend policy in Brazil and they identified that the decision
about dividends is of the Board of Directors in most firms.
The leverage (debt / equity ratio) is higher in firms without Council Fiscal (90.66%)
than firms with Council Fiscal (94.60%). That is not a great difference, and it is not
significant.
Council Fiscal shall opine over management proposals for changes in investment
plans, debt issuance, incorporation and M&A. These decisions may affect the
company leverage. However, as occurs in dividend policy, the Council Fiscal
responsibility is limited, and it has not any participation in the decision process.
Although the firm leverage does not be a Council Fiscal decision, it seems that the
presence of the Fiscal Council in the company inhibits the indebtedness in excess.
The results are shown in table 10. The segmented samples have not revealed any
difference from the entire sample analyze.
Rrms nith Fiscal Council
Firms without Fiscal Council
Dincfend Payout
N
660
318
Mean
49.13%
49.65%
P->alue
0.4208
Leverage
N
770
587
Mean
90.66%
94.60%
P-value
0.2262
Debt Cost
N
753
574
Mean
27.44%
29.82%**
P-\alue
0.0150
denotes a significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
Table 10: Dividend payout, leverage and debt cost
We also find that firms with Fiscal Council are associated with a lower cost of debt
financing. This difference is significant. This could be correlated to leverage. Firms with
smaller debt / equity ratio should have smaller debt cost too.
We also may suppose that Fiscal Council could reduce the firm risk and higher ROE
helps to reduce the debt cost of the firms with Fiscal Council. We find firms with Fiscal
Council have lower debt cost in the group without firms with ADR and firms listed in
some Special Governance Level. The results are presented in Table 11.
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Firms with Fiscal Council
Firms without Fiscal Council
Debt Cost
Firms without ADR
N
609
563
Mean
28.43%
30.03%*
P-value
0.0869
Firms listed in some Special
Corporate Governance Level
N
316
174
Mean
24.64%
28.13%**
P-\alue
0.0287
' denotes a significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
Table 11: Debt cost - without ADR and listed in some Special Corporate
Governance Level groups
These two groups reinforce the hypothesis that the Fiscal Council helps to reduce the
cost of debt of the company.
5.3 Risk
The beta is a predictor of risk for a long-term investor. It is a measure of a stock's price
volatility in relation to the rest of the market. The Fiscal Council does not affect the
Beta firm. This result was expected, because the higher Tobin Q for firms without
suggests that the Fiscal Council is not important for investor. The segmented samples
have not revealed any difference from the entire sample analyze. The results are
presented in table 12.
Firms with Fiscal Council
Firms without Fiscal Council
Beta
N
744
368
Mean
68.64%
65.38%
P-\alue
0.1979
Table 12: Risk
If the investors consider the Fiscal Council benefic to the company, the Beta of firms
with Fiscal Council should be smaller than firms without Fiscal Council.
The Fiscal Council of a Brazilian corporation could be composed of professionals
nominated by the minority and majority shareholders and should be truly independent.
It is mainly charged with monitoring the financial management and reporting of a firm.
Thus the Fiscal Council should reduce the firm risk. However, the Fiscal Council has
not won the investor confidence.
5.4 Regression Model
We run a regression model where the dependent variable is if the firm has Fiscal
Council or not and the other variable analyzed in this research are the independent
variables.
Although the Fiscal Council is our dependent variable, this does not necessarily imply
that the independent variables cause Fiscal Council. This regression can be a helpful
tool in determining the strength of the relationship between the variables.
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The independent variables of our model are firms with ADR, firm has adhered to some
Corporate Governance Level, ROE, Leverage, Debt cost, Tobin-0, Beta, Payout and
Year. Most of them is statistical significant, only Payout and Year are not significant.
The results are shown in Table 13.
The variable ADR has the highest coefficient. It was expected, because firms with
ADR must have a Board of Auditors and SEC accepts that the Brazilian Fiscal Council
act as a Board of Auditors.
The ROE has a high coefficient too, it reinforce our finds that the Fiscal Council
contributes to increase the firm performance.
The variable firm has adhered to some Corporate Governance Level has the highest
negative coefficient. We believe that is consequence of the firms in Novo Mercado do
not have non-voting shares, thus, it was harder to minority shareholders to elect a
Fiscal Council member before 2008 when CVM changed the understanding of the Law
and allowed minorities of any firm that has at least 10% of voting shares in the market
elect a member one member of the Fiscal Council.
The Beta also has a high negative coefficient what suggests that Fiscal Council reduce
the firm risk.
The Tobin-0 is negative, and this is one more indicator that the investor does not
value the Fiscal Council, although the important benefits to the company and
shareholders.
The others statistical significant variable (leverage and debt cost) have very low
coefficients.
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Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adiusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations
ANOVA
Regression
Residual
Total
Intercept
ADR***
CCL*
ROE**
Leverage***
Debt cost**
Tobin-0**
Beta**
Payout
Year
0.300136208
0.090081743
0.075714613
0.458428226
580
df
9
570
579
CoefBcients
-7.0545
0.2458
-0.0781
0.1821
0.0008
-0.0038
-0.0297
-0.0671
0.0046
0.0039
Significance F
0.0000
P-value
0.7715
0.0000
0.0545
0.0133
0.0020
0.0311
0.0190
0.0148
0.8409
0.7482
***, **, * denotes a significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
Table 13: Regression model
5.5 Earnings Management
For every firm without Fiscal Council that reported a small loss there were 5.22 firms
that reported a small profit. This ratio of small profit to small loss firms with Fiscal
Council is 2.36.
The results are shown in table 14. The histograms of both groups are presented in
figures 1 and 2. This suggests that firms without Fiscal Council manage reported
earnings to avoid small losses.
The companies with Fiscal Council also reports much more small profit than small
loss, however, the ratio small profit to small loss is not significant and much smaller
than the ratio of firms without Fiscal Council.
Firms with Fiscal Council
Firms vûthout Fiscal Council
Small
loss
14
9
Small
profit
33
47
Ratio
2.36
5.22**
P-value
0.1174
0.0482
***, **, * denotes a significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
Table 14: Ratio of small profit to small loss
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Figure 1. ROE histogram of firms without Fiscal Council
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Figure 2. ROE histogram of firms with Fiscal Council
It is not possible affirm that the Fiscal Council eliminate the earnings management,
however, our finds indicate that earnings management is less common in firms with
Fiscal Council.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS.
The Brazilian Fiscal Council has competence to improve shareholder protection and
force companies to better disclosure for investors. Our research found real benefits to
firms with Fiscal Council, as higher ROE, lower debt cost and less earning
management. These benefits are meanly important to firms with less Corporate
Governance.
This is an important mechanism that could be used by minority shareholders of all
Brazilian listed firms. However, around 46% of listed companies do not have Fiscal
Council.
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It seems that Brazilian investors or do not the Law that allow them to require the Fiscal
Council or they do not believe that the Fiscal Council could mitigate some important
problems of corporate governance.
The investor indifference to Fiscal Council is evidenced by the lower Tobin Q and
higher Beta of firms with Fiscal Council.
Brazil is considered as a country with little legal protection for investors. Despite this,
Brazilian Law has created some important mechanism of shareholders protection that
could be used, even, in more protected markets, but some Brazilian investors do not
take advantage from these mechanisms allowed by the Law.
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